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INTRODUCTION	
Since Xi Jinping assumed leadership in 2012, the ‘Core Socialist Values’ (henceforth 
referred to as CSVs) have been heavily promoted throughout China. Backed by the Chinese 
Communist Party’s (CCP) massive propaganda apparatus, a variety of propaganda and related 
activities have been used to increase the presence of values in everyday life. Posters extolling the 
values line the streets and public areas, video advertisements for the values are played in cinemas 
before movie screenings,1 and school textbooks have been revised to include more CSVs content.2  
The CSVs are widely recognized as a crucial component of Xi Jinping’s ‘Chinese Dream’ 
narrative and strategy, but were first articulated by Hu Jintao in 2012 during the 18th Party 
Congress. Hu specified a total of twelve values, which were subsequently grouped into three 
categories – national, societal, and citizen. Encapsulated in 24 Chinese characters, the national 
values include: prosperity, democracy, civility, and harmony; the societal values include: freedom, 
equality, justice, and rule of law; the citizen values include: patriotism, dedication, integrity, and 
friendship. Prior to this, references to the construction of a ‘core socialist values system’ were made, 
but without substantive explication of what these values might be.  
More than a propaganda exercise, the CSVs constitute a moral code that applies both to 
individuals as well as to society. As Xi Jinping said, “core values are in fact individual virtues, as well 
as public, social and national virtues”.3 Beyond posters and advertisements, the Party-state has also 
used the CSVs to explain its decisions to prohibit a variety of ‘immoral’ things, from violent video 
games4 to ‘female virtue schools’.5 This latest attempt to instill values and raise moral standards 
comes after more than a decade of not only strong economic growth, but also widespread 
corruption and a general perception of moral decay within society. For example, a recent survey 
found that 47% of Chinese people rank moral decline as one of society’s top three issues.6 Xi 
Jinping has also responded to the perceived moral crisis within the party by initiating an anti-
																																																								
1 "Chinese Cinemagoers Must Watch Propaganda Clips before Films", BBC News, (7 July 2017), available at: 
https://www.bbc.com/news/entertainment-arts-40530850/ (accessed 26 May 2018). 	
2 Charlotte Gao, "New Chinese Textbooks: Now With More 'Socialist Core Values'”, The Diplomat, (8 
September 2017), available at: https://thediplomat.com/2017/09/new-chinese-textbooks-now-with-more-
socialist-core-values/ (accessed 26 May 2018). 	
3 Speech 3a. Please refer to Appendix A for more reference details. 
4 Zheping Huang, "China Is Blocking the World's Hottest Video Game Because It Lacks ‘Core Socialist 
Values’”, Quartz, (30 October 2017), available at: https://qz.com/1114851/playerunknowns-battlegrounds-
chinas-blocking-the-worlds-hottest-video-game-because-it-lacks-core-socialist-values/  (accessed 26 May 
2018).	
5 "China Closes School 'Teaching Women to Be Obedient'", BBC News, (4 December 2017), available at: 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-42218618/ (accessed 26 May 2018). 	
6 Helen Gao, "The Chinese Communist Party's Guide to Moral Living", The New York Times, (15 November 
2017), available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/15/opinion/chinese-communist-party-xi-jinping.html/ 
(accessed 26 May 2018).	
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corruption campaign and party rectification program, and these constitute centerpieces in his 
political program.  
 The push for moral standards arguably began in the 1980s. As the harsh control systems of 
Maoist China gave way to economic growth and increased freedoms, a variety of social issues 
appeared and Marxist ideology was increasingly deemphasized. The rupture from socialist systems 
of morality and control meant that the values and institutions regulating people’s behavior were 
destroyed, leaving China with an ideological and moral vacuum. Thus, Link characterized China’s 
‘core problem’ as the “lack of a publicly accepted set of moral values to define proper behavior”.7 It 
was in this context that ‘socialist spiritual civilization’ campaigns were launched in order to re-
emphasize and outline moral norms for social conduct.8 
 Some may simply regard the CSVs as yet another round of propaganda by the CCP, or 
deem the entire exercise overly paternalistic. It is, however, worth noting that China’s history is 
peppered with morality campaigns, and state efforts to inculcate virtue and morality amongst its 
citizens are not new. Morality has played a central role throughout Chinese political history and 
features prominently in Chinese expectations and understandings of good governance. As Pye 
summarizes, there is a “well-established tradition [in China] that government and politics should be 
thought of only in terms of moralistic ideology”.9 Reflecting the contemporary importance of morality 
in politics, Kang’s survey found that 90.1% of respondents agree that “the government should be 
responsible for advocating good moral values”, and 62.7% agree that “the government should 
decide whether certain values can be discussed in society”.10  
Situating the CSVs campaign within this broader political tradition, this thesis hopes to 
investigate the morality-politics nexus further in contemporary political practice through the lens of 
the CSVs campaign. My research thus aims to address the following question: what moral narrative 
does the CCP’s central leadership construct and present through the CSVs campaign? Further sub-
questions include: i) how are the CSVs defined, ii) what purpose does the CSVs campaign serve in 
the domestic context, and iii) what role does the CCP, specifically the central leadership, construct 
for itself. As my research question reflects, I have scoped my research narrowly so that it focuses 
on one campaign and specifically on the ‘narrative’ emanating from the level of the central 
leadership. It thus precludes state-level variations of the campaign. At the same time, however, my 
research has the potential to be conceptually broad as it does not fixate on a particular relationship 
between morality and politics but instead leaves it open-ended. 																																																								
7 Perry Link, "China's ‘Core’ Problem", Daedalus 122(2), (1993), p. 192.	
8 Michael Keane, "Redefining Chinese Citizenship", Economy and Society 30(1), (2001), pp. 1-17.	
9 Lucian Pye, Asian Power and Politics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 186.	
10 Xiaoguang Kang, “A Study of the Renaissance of Traditional Confucian Culture in Contemporary China”, in 
Fenggang Yang and Joseph Tamney, eds, Confucianism and Spiritual Traditions in Modern China and 
Beyond (Leiden: Brill 2011), p. 44.	
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The literature review in the next section addresses the academic works on Chinese regime 
legitimacy, especially those representing culturalist views, and Chinese political language. In the 
following section, I describe my primary materials and the discourse analysis methods I used. The 
bulk of the thesis then focuses on my findings and analysis, which are further divided into three 
sections. The first section focuses on the way the CSVs are described and defined, and the basis of 
its appeal. The next two sections illustrate the purposes of the CSVs campaign in the domestic 
context. Specifically, morality is an important governance tool and contributes to the maintenance of 
social order and social control. Morality is further presented as a matter of national importance, 
which reflects the belief that the population’s moral character determines national strength. Finally, 
in the conclusion, I review the limitations of my research as well as topics that merit further 
investigation, before relating my findings to the broader conceptual issues I began this paper with.  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 As mentioned earlier, the CSVs can be positioned within a long line of moral and civic 
campaigns undertaken by the CCP as well as other Chinese states. For example, Chiang Kai-
shek’s Republican regime implemented the New Life Movement to educate citizens on morality and 
discipline.11 State-sponsored systems to reward virtuous conduct were also common across various 
dynasties in the imperial era,12 although the most well-known moral campaign is probably Emperor 
Kangxi’s promulgation of moral instructions through the ‘Sacred Edict’.13 The morality-politics nexus 
has featured prominently throughout Chinese political history and it is useful to consider the CSVs in 
this context, rather than regard their conception as an isolated event.  
 In academia, the morality-politics nexus is most extensively addressed in the field of Chinese 
political philosophy and especially in studies of Confucianism. My research, however, focuses on 
contemporary political practice. It thus relates more directly to academic scholarship on the CCP’s 
regime legitimacy and especially to culturalist views, which adapt the relationship between morality 
and politics as presented in traditional Chinese philosophy to contemporary governance. 
Additionally, the CSVs also constitute a significant propaganda exercise undertaken by Xi Jinping 
and the central CCP leadership. The term ‘Core Socialist Values’ is a political formulation or tifa, and 
my research question focuses explicitly on the ‘narrative’ constructed through discursive materials. 
A review of academic literature on Chinese political language and discourse is thus necessary. It 
																																																								
11 Arif Dirlik, “The Ideological Foundations of the New Life Movement: A Study in Counterrevolution”, Journal 
of Asian Studies 34(4), (1975), pp. 945-980. 
12 Mark Elvin, "Female Virtue and the State in China", Past & Present 104, (1984), pp. 111-152. 
13 Victor H. Mair, “Language and Ideology in the Written Popularizations of the Sacred Edict”, in David 
Johnson, Andrew J. Nathan and Judith A. Berling, eds, Popular Culture in Late Imperial China (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1985), pp. 325-359.	
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would serve as a baseline for my discourse analysis on the CSVs, and my research findings would 
ultimately relate to this set of academic literature as well. 
 Given the newness of the CSVs campaign, academic writing on it remains limited and thus 
warrants only a brief review. The remainder of this literature review will then address the scholarship 
on Chinese political legitimacy, with an emphasis on culturalist views, before moving on to the 
academic literature on Chinese political language and discourse. Through this literature review, I 
aim to develop a comprehensive understanding of key academic publications, debates and gaps 
relevant to these topics, and they will in turn serve as relevant background information for my own 
analysis of the CSVs campaign. Given the wealth of academic literature on both of these topics, my 
literature review is not meant to be exhaustive. Instead, I have included the aspects that are most 
relevant to my research, and hope to clarify the academic concepts and debates that my research 
relates to.  
Core	Socialist	Values	
As of the time of writing, there is only one published article that deals specifically with the 
CSVs, although the CSVs are also afforded substantial analysis in two other pieces of scholarship. 
Adopting an economic perspective, Feng evaluates the usefulness of the CSVs for China’s 
economic development and ability to overcome the middle-income trap. 14 In contrast, Gow, Brown 
and Bērzina-Čerenkova argue that the CSVs campaign indicates Xi Jinping’s emphasis on culture 
and ideology, 15 in contrast to the primacy of economic development under Hu Jintao’s leadership. 
Drawing on Gramscian concepts of hegemony, common sense, and the integral state, Gow argues 
that the CSVs campaign is a consensus-building exercise used to reinforce state hegemony, and is 
a centerpiece of the Party-state’s project to transform the country’s ‘superstructure’. 16 Regarding the 
CSVs as ‘keywords’ that provide clues to Xi Jinping’s ideology, Brown and Bērzina-Čerenkova 
conclude that they signal the CCP’s attempt to appeal on an emotional level and willingness to 
utilize ideas from a variety of sources.17 
In the field of international relations, the CSVs also feature occasionally in discussions of 
China’s cultural soft power. For instance, Chen suggests that the CSVs demonstrate potential for 
universal appeal, although the simultaneous narratives of Chinese exceptionalism and particularity 
																																																								
14 Michael X. Y. Feng, “The ‘Chinese Dream’ Deconstructed: Values and Institutions”, Journal of Chinese 
Political Science 20, (2015), pp. 163-183. 
15 Michael Gow, "The Core Socialist Values of the Chinese Dream: Towards a Chinese Integral State", Critical 
Asian Studies 49(1), (2017), pp. 92-116; Kerry Brown and Una Aleksandra Bērziņa-Čerenkova, "Ideology in 
the Era of Xi Jinping", Journal of Chinese Political Science, (2018), pp. 1-17.	
16 Gow, "The Core Socialist Values of the Chinese Dream”. 
17 Brown and Bērziņa-Čerenkova, "Ideology in the Era of Xi Jinping". 
	 7 
complicate this. 18 The theme of soft power does prove to be a relatively significant one in the CSVs 
discourse. However, because my research question focuses on the moral narrative in the domestic 
context, academic scholarship on China’s soft power is not particularly relevant to my research.  
Chinese	Political	Legitimacy	
 In the field of Chinese political legitimacy, the general consensus is that the CCP regime 
enjoys high levels of support and legitimacy. Despite repeated projections of legitimacy crises, the 
CCP’s one-party rule remains strong, and empirical evidence produced over the past two decades 
indicate high levels of regime support.19 The resiliency and apparent popularity of the CCP regime 
has in turn directed academic debate away from the amount of legitimacy the regime enjoys and 
towards the sources of Chinese political legitimacy instead.20 
 The conventional wisdom is that, in place of the Party-state’s diminished claim to legitimacy 
on the basis of ideology, the CCP in the post-Mao era relies on a combination of economic 
prosperity, nationalism, and social stability to sustain its legitimacy.21 Furthermore, most scholars 
who adopt this view suggest that the political legitimacy of the CCP remains fragile, as economic 
downturns are inevitable, democratic structures and procedures are weak, and the political regime 
is not morally justifiable.22 Thus, the Party-state may be able to extend its rule, but will not be able to 
renew its political legitimacy indefinitely.23  
 However, the failed predictions regarding China’s political future and continued support for 
the CCP regime have given rise to a newly emerging discussion regarding Chinese exceptionalism 
and the Chinese model. 24  Challenging the conventional wisdom regarding Chinese political 
legitimacy, some scholars propose explanations for the CCP’s ability to generate, renew and sustain 
legitimacy over the long run. These arguments can be broadly classified as either culturalist or 
institutionalist.25 Briefly, institutionalist arguments suggest that the regime continually innovates and 																																																								
18 Qi Chen, "China’s Soft Power Policies and Strategies: The Cultural Activist State", Journal of Law, Social 
Justice and Global Development 1, (2016), p. 7.	
19 Tianjian Shi, "Cultural Values and Political Trust: A Comparison of the People's Republic of China and 
Taiwan”, Comparative Politics 33(4), (2001), pp. 401-419; Jie Chen, Popular Political Support in Urban China 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004); Michael S. Lewis-Beck, Wenfang Tang and Nicholas F. 
Martini, "A Chinese Popularity Function: Sources of Government Support", Political Research Quarterly 67(1), 
(2014), pp. 16-25.	
20 Yun-Han Chu, “Sources of Regime Legitimacy and the Debate Over the Chinese Model", China 
Review 13(1), (2013), p. 5.	
21 Robert Weatherley, Politics in China Since 1949: Legitimizing Authoritarian Rule (New York, NY: Routledge, 
2006). 
22 Ibid. 
23 Zhengxu Wang, "With the Rise of China, What’s New for Comparative Politics?", Chinese Political Science 
Review 1(3), (2016), p. 516.	
24 See for instance, Wei Pan, "Western System versus Chinese System", University of Nottingham 
Contemporary China Centre Briefing Series 61, (2010). 
25 Chu, "Sources of Regime Legitimacy”, p. 5.  
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adapts political institutions and processes, and is consequently able to satisfy and manage its 
people’s demands. 26  
 Proponents of the culturalist view, on the other hand, point towards China’s unique cultural 
heritage and unanimously propose explanations that draw from China’s traditional philosophies 
(especially Confucianism). In doing so, they implicitly or explicitly reject the wholesale application of 
western concepts of political legitimacy to China. Wang, for example, reiterates that political 
legitimacy is an alien concept to China, and applauds culturalist attempts to uncover indigenous 
concepts that are more applicable to Chinese politics and governance. 27 Similarly, Guo explains the 
repeated failures of forecasting China’s political future with western scholars’ inability to 
comprehend legitimation in the context of Chinese political history. 28 
 Utilizing concepts from traditional Chinese philosophies instead, culturalists point towards 
historical continuities in the understanding of political legitimacy and good governance from imperial 
times to today. For instance, Guo proposes a traditional model of legitimation that combines original 
and utilitarian justifications, such as benefiting the people (limin), rule by virtue (renzhi) and popular 
consent (minben). 29 Reflecting similar ideas, Tong argues that Chinese political legitimacy is based 
on a historically rooted moral bond between state and society. 30 Apart from fulfilling its moral 
responsibilities, the Chinese state also claims legitimacy on the basis of its ideological and moral 
authority, and enhancing the glory of the Chinese civilization.31 Referring to Chinese political culture 
more generally, Fairbrother suggests that the institution of paternalism, which has its primary basis 
in classical Confucian contexts, has influenced expectations and understandings of good 
governance throughout Chinese history. 32 Adhering to these cultural rules, the CCP in turn adopt a 
paternalistic character by being moral exemplars and by demonstrating concern for people’s 
spiritual and material wellbeing.  
Reflecting the prominence of morality in traditional Chinese philosophies, the systems of 
legitimation proposed by the aforementioned scholars similarly draw attention to the moral character 
and responsibilities of the Chinese state. My investigation into the importance and function of 																																																								
26 Gunter Schubert, “One-Party Rule and the Question of Legitimacy in Contemporary China: Preliminary 
Thoughts on Setting Up a New Research Agenda”, Journal of Contemporary China 17(54), (2008), pp. 191-
204; Andrew Nathan, “Authoritarian Resilience,” Journal of Democracy 14(1), (2003), pp. 6-16. 
27 Wang, "With the Rise of China", p. 515.  
28 Baogang Guo, "Political Legitimacy and China’s Transition", Journal of Chinese Political Science 8(1-2), 
(2003), p. 2.	
29 Ibid. 
30 Yanqi Tong, "Morality, Benevolence, and Responsibility: Regime Legitimacy in China from Past to the 
Present", Journal of Chinese Political Science 16(2), (2011), pp. 141-159.	
31 Vivienne Shue, "Legitimacy Crisis in China?", in Peter Hays Gries and Stanley Rosen, eds, State and 
Society in 21st Century China (London: Routledge, 2004), pp. 24-49.	
32 Gregory P. Fairbrother, “The Chinese Paternalistic State and Moral Education”, in Kerry J. Kennedy, 
Gregory P. Fairbrother and Zhao Zhenzhou, eds, Citizenship Education in China: Preparing Citizens for the 
"Chinese Century” (New York, NY: Routledge, 2014), pp. 11-26. 
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morality as expressed through the CSVs campaign thus relates directly to culturalist views on 
political legitimacy in China. Moreover, according to ideas in traditional Chinese philosophies, the 
state is morally responsible for both the material and spiritual livelihood of its people.33 With the 
exception of Fairbrother, who analyzed moral education textbooks to evince the state’s concern for 
people’s spiritual livelihoods, other scholars tend to focus primarily on the state’s responsibility for 
the material welfare of its people.34 Regarding the CSVs campaign as a form of moral education, 
this research addresses this imbalance in the academic literature and focuses on the state’s 
concern for the moral wellbeing of its people, which is a feature that remains insufficiently 
addressed in the literature.  
Findings from empirical studies and public opinion polls lend further support to culturalist 
claims that China’s political and governance systems are based on indigenous, non-Western 
philosophies. 35 Asian Barometer Survey results, for example, show that traditional Chinese beliefs 
play a key role in influencing overall regime legitimacy.36 Most Chinese intellectuals (including party 
intellectuals and government officials), however, resist such culturalist arguments, and prefer to 
apply western concepts and theories of political legitimacy to China instead.37 This highlights an 
interesting cleavage in the literature, which this research paper hopes to address by comparing the 
contrasting views with the claims reflected in official discourse produced by the state.  
Furthermore, in contrast to culturalists’ tendencies towards interpretive arguments and 
explanations,38 this research avoids applying a predetermined interpretive framework to the analysis 
of the CSVs campaign. This minimizes the risk of reading culturalist claims into the discourse where 
there are none, and leaves open the possibility of understanding the morality-politics nexus in other 
ways. The latter point is particularly salient as the relationship between morality and politics also 
surfaces prominently in discrete works that relate to different academic discourses, beyond the 
debate on Chinese regime legitimacy. Thornton, for example, illustrates how central authorities 
construct and impose moral agendas in order to regulate local political life and consolidate state 																																																								
33 Ibid. 
34 See for instance, Elizabeth J. Perry,  "Chinese Conceptions of “Rights”: From Mencius to Mao—and 
now", Perspectives on Politics 6(1), (2008), pp. 37-50; Guo, "Political Legitimacy and China’s Transition”; 
Dingxin Zhao, "The Mandate of Heaven and Performance Legitimation in Historical and Contemporary 
China", American Behavioral Scientist 53(3), (2009), pp. 416-433.	
35 Yun-han Chu and Yu-tzung Chang, “Culture Shift and Regime Legitimacy: Comparing Mainland China, 
Taiwan and Hong Kong”, Shiping Hua and Andrew J. Nathan, eds, Chinese Political Culture (New York, NY: 
Routledge, 2001), pp. 320-347; Tianjian Shi and Jie Lu, "The Shadow of Confucianism”, Journal of 
Democracy 21(4), (2010), pp.123-130; Doh Chull Shin, “Confucianism as a Government of Paternalistic 
Meritocracy”, in Confucianism and Democratization in East Asia (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 
2011), pp. 106-140. 	
36 Chu, "Sources of Regime Legitimacy". 	
37 Jinghan Zeng, "The Debate on Regime Legitimacy in China: Bridging the Wide Gulf Between Western and 
Chinese Scholarship", Journal of Contemporary China 23(88), (2014), pp. 612-635.	
38 See for instance, Guo, "Political Legitimacy and China’s Transition”, as well as Shue, "Legitimacy Crisis in 
China?”. 
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power. 39 Analyses of moral education in China also highlight the historic conflation of ideology, 
politics and morality,40 although recent trends suggest that moral education is becoming increasingly 
depoliticized.41 These academic works similarly present the Chinese state as a moral agent, and 
offer arguments that are potentially relevant to the analysis of morality in the CSVs discourse. 
Chinese	Political	Communications	
In the wake of Deng Xiaoping’s reform and opening up policies, the landscape of Chinese 
political communications has changed significantly over the past few decades. These changes are 
important because they relate directly to the effectiveness of the Chinese government’s ‘thought 
work’ (sixiang gongzuo), which is defined as the struggle to control information flows and structure 
the “symbolic environment” from which people derive their worldviews and values.42 There are 
several academic debates in this field, but I will focus primarily on the academic scholarship 
regarding Chinese political language and the role of official discourse in this literature review. These 
issues are particularly relevant to my own research because the term ‘Core Socialist Values’ is a 
tifa, which is an important feature of Chinese political language, and because of my upcoming 
analysis of official discourse materials.  
 The importance of language in Chinese politics is widely recognized. The fixation with 
politically correct forms of language was evident during imperial times and persisted through Mao’s 
era to today. 43 Schoenhals was among the first to draw attention to the formalized nature of 
Chinese political language, and in particular, the rigidity of the language in terms of form rather than 
content.44 The resulting impoverishment of language reflects the extent of the CCP’s discursive 
control,45 and produces monotonous political discourses consisting of carefully worded texts that 
cross-reference each other.46 Tifas or political formulations, in particular, are the epitome of such 
formalization and highlight the care with which words are chosen. Characterized by their fixed forms 
and political correctness, tifas have been a constant and important feature of Chinese political life.47  																																																								
39 Patricia M. Thornton, Disciplining the State: Virtue, Violence and State-Making in Modern China 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007). 
40 Li et al., "Deyu as Moral Education in Modern China: Ideological Functions and Transformations", Journal of 
Moral Education 33(4), (2004), pp. 449-464.	
41 Wing On Lee and Chi Hang Ho, "Ideopolitical Shifts and Changes in Moral Education Policy in 
China", Journal of Moral Education 34(4), (2005), pp. 413-431.	
42 David C. Lynch, After the Propaganda State: Media, Politics, and ‘Thought Work’ in Reformed China 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), p. 2. 
43 John Delury, "’Harmonious’ in China", Policy Review 148, (2008), pp. 35-44; Joseph J. Alvaro, "Political 
Discourse in China's English Language Press", World Englishes 32(2), (2013), pp. 147-168.	
44 Michael Schoenhals, Doing Things With Words in Chinese Politics: Five Studies (Berkeley, CA: University 
of California Institute of East Asian Studies, 1992).	
45 Ibid. 
46 Alvaro, "Political Discourse in China's English Language Press”. 
47 Schoenhals, Doing Things With Words in Chinese Politics; Falk Hartig, "Political Slogans as Instruments of 
International Government Communication – The Case of China", The Journal of International 
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 Given its formalized and scripted nature, Chinese political language transmits political 
signals very effectively. As Delury writes, “because of the care with which the CCP scripts itself, 
changes in terminology signify shifts in power or policy with greater predictability than is the case in 
more anarchic linguistic environments”.48 Tifas, especially, serve as important political signposts; 
they are crafted and employed deliberately, and even subtle changes could indicate shifts in 
prevailing politics and policies.49 As important tools in China’s governing process, tifas also help to 
frame policies and issues of Chinese governance,50 and are used to direct the nation in particular 
ways.51 
 Beyond political signposting, the formalized nature of Chinese political language also 
represents an exercise of political power.52 Through formalized language, the state regulates what is 
said and written, and makes the “language of the state the sole legitimate medium of political 
expression”.53 Those who insist on using inappropriate or politically incorrect formulations may not 
be given the opportunity to voice themselves, and may be subjected to the coercive powers of the 
state instead. 54  More powerfully, the impoverishment of language can translate into the 
impoverishment of thought.55 Formalized language contains “intrinsic power [because] … they cut 
off alternative ways of thinking and limit the conceptual horizons of the people who adopt them”.56 
Language thus has the power to remold thought, perpetuate thoughtlessness, and exert ideological 
and social control. This aspect of Chinese political language was especially salient during the 
Cultural Revolution, which was the height of ideological fervor and language formalization, and the 
wealth of literature on political language during this period is thus unsurprising.57  
 Since the Cultural Revolution and Schoenhals’ seminal work in 1992, Chinese political 
language has evolved but the nature of its evolution continues to be a matter of debate. Schoenhals 
himself predicted a decline in the use of formalized language.58 Some scholars have confirmed this 																																																																																																																																																																																										
Communication 24(1), (2018), pp. 115-137; Perry Link, An Anatomy of Chinese (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2013). 
48 Delury, "’Harmonious’ in China", p. 36. 
49 Gang Qian, Watchwords: Reading China Through its Political Vocabulary, translated by David Bandurski, 
(2012), available at: http://chinamediaproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/WATCHWORDS_Reading-
China-Through-its-Party-Vocabulary.pdf.	
50 Susan Trevaskes, "A Law Unto Itself: Chinese Communist Party Leadership and Yifa Zhiguo in the Xi 
Era", Modern China 44(4), (2018), pp. 1-27.	
51 Alvaro, "Political Discourse in China's English Language Press”. 
52 Schoenhals, Doing Things With Words in Chinese Politics. 
53 Ibid., p. 3. 
54 Ibid.; Alvaro, "Political Discourse in China's English Language Press”. 
55 Xing Lu, "An Ideological/Cultural Analysis of Political Slogans in Communist China," Discourse & 
Society 10(4), (1999), pp. 487-508.	
56 Link, An Anatomy of Chinese, p. 275. 
57 See for instance, Xing Lu, Rhetoric of the Chinese Cultural Revolution (Columbia, SC: University of South 
Carolina Press, 2004), as well as Fengyuan Ji, Linguistic Engineering: Language and Politics in Mao's China 
(Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press, 2004).	
58 Schoenhals, Doing Things With Words in Chinese Politics, p. 29. 
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prediction, and suggest that contemporary citizens are repulsed by ossified political language.59 An 
expanded political vocabulary consequently provides more political actors with access to platforms 
of expression, as well as increased freedoms to act. 60 Some, however, point to the continued 
importance of tifas and watchwords,61 as well as the level of precision and nuance that goes into 
their formulation.62 They also highlight the CCP’s ability to adapt its language to more politically 
sophisticated audiences 63  and utilize popular culture to increase the appeal of its tifas and 
ideology.64 
 Accompanying the evolution of Chinese political language, the CCP’s propaganda and 
political communications system has also undergone significant changes since the era of Mao. The 
academic debate regarding the level of control that the CCP retains over information flows remains 
inconclusive. Some argue that the CCP’s control has weakened due to processes such as the 
commercialization of media, reducing the importance of the role of propaganda in contemporary 
Chinese politics.65 On the other hand, others suggest that the CCP has expertly adapted to new 
structures and systems, and remains firmly in control.66 For example, Zhang argues that the Party-
state has successfully constructed hegemony through coercive and co-optative methods, thus 
becoming “one of the world’s most sophisticated in the management of the media”.67  
 It is in turn necessary to reconsider the role and function of official discourse within the 
context of this broader debate. The arguments put forth by scholars on either side of the debate 
center primarily on the state’s management and control of newer forms of media. Thus, despite the 
spectrum of views on the effectiveness of the overall propaganda system, the general consensus is 
that the Party-state continues to retain strong control of official discourse and its transmission 
through the state’s traditional communication apparatus. Despite changing ownership and profit 
incentives, the main forms of Chinese media remain hyper-managed by the state.68 For example, 
newspaper editorials in main newspapers such as Xinhua News and People’s Daily are subject to 
extreme vetting. The CCP’s Propaganda Department sometimes drafts the editorials first, as well as 																																																								
59 Brown and Bērziņa-Čerenkova, "Ideology in the Era of Xi Jinping". 
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62 Alvaro, "Political Discourse in China's English Language Press”; Trevaskes, "A Law Unto Itself”. 
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(Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2016). 
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dictates the exact wordings or formulations that journalists are allowed to use.69 Collectively, these 
official and semi-official texts provide official rationales, positions and guidelines on government 
policies, and attain canonical status within public political discourse.70 Belonging to a specific subset 
of political discourse and communications, these texts are characterized by a distinctly ‘conservative 
mode of discursive reproduction’, and represent the CCP’s attempts at maintaining stability and 
continuity.71  
Preliminary	Conclusions	
In this literature review, I have outlined the main academic debates surrounding China’s 
regime legitimacy and Chinese political communications, as well as identified ways in which my 
research relates to and contributes to the existing literature. Specifically, my focus on morality in the 
CSVs campaign could potentially release evidence to support or reject culturalist claims regarding 
Chinese political legitimacy, while my discourse analysis of contemporary tifas and Chinese political 
language provides a timely update to the existing literature.  
Proponents of the culturalist view seek ultimately to complicate conventional understandings 
of the authoritarian label in China by employing native political concepts and foregrounding the 
responsive features of moral politics in China. 72  In a similar vein, I hope to further nuance 
understandings of the authoritarian state and its propaganda practices by regarding the CSVs 
campaign as more than a simple propaganda exercise. In particular, my research suggests that the 
CSVs campaign can be more meaningfully understood in terms of China’s indigenous political 
frameworks and beliefs about governance.  
METHODS 	 This research paper seeks specifically to uncover the moral narrative that the CCP’s central 
leadership has constructed through the CSVs campaign. Given the narrative focus, I decided to 
address the question by conducting a discourse analysis of relevant textual materials as opposed to 
analyzing relevant policy moves. Additionally, in order to obtain a comprehensive view of the 
narrative that the central leadership aims to construct, I selected textual materials from various 
official and semi-official sources, and excluded propaganda materials and articles produced at lower 
political levels. The selected materials include policy documents, speeches by top CCP leaders, and 
articles from People’s Daily and Seeking Truth (Qiushi). These can be described as ‘closed texts’ 																																																								
69 David Shambaugh, "China's Propaganda System: Institutions, Processes and Efficacy", The China 
Journal 57, (2007), p. 53.	
70 Qing Cao, "Introduction: Legitimisation, Resistance and Discursive Struggles in Contemporary China", in 
Qing Cao, Hailong Tian and Paul Chilton, eds, Discourse, Politics and Media in Contemporary China 
(Amsterdam, John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2014), p. 11.	
71 Ibid. 
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that are produced within the discursive confines of official discourse, and are characterized by what 
Cao terms the ‘conservative mode of discourse reproduction’.73 A total of 94 articles and speeches 
produced between 2012 and 2017 were identified, and a complete list of these materials can be 
found in Appendix A.  
Selection	of	Primary	Materials	
Textual materials from official sources include Hu Jintao’s report at the 18th Party Congress, 
which is when the CSVs were first coined, and multiple speeches by Xi Jinping, including his report 
at the 19th Party Congress in 2017 as well as speeches published in the chapter “Culturally 
Advanced China” from The Governance of China (English edition). This chapter was chosen given 
the categorization of the CSVs under the cultural sphere in both the 18th and 19th Party Congress 
Reports. Since The Governance of China is a government publication, these speeches were 
especially useful sources of official translations for standard formulations and descriptions used 
throughout the CSVs discourse. Beyond speeches, the two policy documents released by the CCP 
General Office concerning the CSVs were also identified for analysis.  
 To supplement these official materials, I also selected articles from Seeking Truth and 
People’s Daily for analysis. Seeking Truth is the party’s authoritative ideological journal, while 
People’s Daily is widely regarded as a mouthpiece for the CCP.74 To identify only the most relevant 
articles, I selected those that included the term ‘Core Socialist Values’ in its title. The search for 
Seeking Truth articles was easily conducted through the online archives. People’s Daily articles 
were similarly identified through the Seeking Truth website archives. This indirect access is unlikely 
to affect the primary materials significantly. In fact, the appearance of these articles on the Seeking 
Truth website indicates an additional layer of political endorsement. This selection process yielded a 
total of eight Seeking Truth articles and 75 People’s Daily articles.   
 It is also important to recognize that there is a hierarchy of sorts amongst these textual 
materials. Policy documents and speeches by top CCP leaders possess clear authority and exert 
strong influences and direction on the entire discourse, whereas Seeking Truth and People’s Daily 
articles are typically written by party intellectuals or lower level bureaucrats in response to central 
leadership directives to signal their obeisance and loyalty. The first policy document on the CSVs 
released at the end of 2013 served as a strong signal for the political importance of the CSVs. It is 
thus unsurprising that 2014 was by far the most prolific year, as a majority of selected Seeking Truth 
and People’s Daily articles were published that year. Responding to official speeches and 
documents, Seeking Truth and People’s Daily articles tend to imitate the language, echo similar 
messages and quote extensively from official texts. However, these articles also sometimes offer 																																																								
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more elaborate explanations as well as provide concrete examples of campaign efforts at 
grassroots levels. An awareness of this hierarchy in turn contributes to a better understanding of 
how the state-sponsored CSVs discourse is shaped.  
Discourse	Analysis	Methods	
Discourse analysis denotes a theoretical and methodological approach to language and 
language use. Born out of the field of linguistics, discourse analysis is an interdisciplinary approach 
that aims to uncover implicit or hidden ideologies in discourses, and examine how actors use 
language to reproduce power relations.75	Applying discourse analysis methods to the selected 
primary materials, I began my analysis by testing a preliminary set of coding categories on the 
speeches and policy documents. Given their ‘canonical’ status within the CSVs discourse, these 
materials were likely to contain the main themes, narrative strands and standard formulations that 
run consistently throughout the entire discourse. They thus served as a suitable sample of textual 
materials for the testing and refinement of my coding categories.  
Having identified the main themes, I conducted a survey of relevant secondary literature in 
order to refine my coding categories further. In the second and final round of discourse analysis, all 
selected materials were coded according to the following questions:  
1. How are the CSVs defined and what is the basis of its appeal? 
2. What is the relationship between the CSVs and traditional Chinese culture? 
3. How do the CSVs relate to social governance and the socialist rule of law? 
4. Why are the CSVs important for the nation?  
5. How is the party represented? 
ANALYSIS76 
Across the different sources and over the five-year period, language and messages 
remained fairly consistent. While the repeated use of standard formulations and descriptions 
produced a rather monotonous discourse, it also made it easier to identify key themes within the 
discourse. In the subsequent sections, when referring to standard formulations or messages that 
appear in multiple places, I provide examples of specific articles or speeches where they can be 
found but this list is not exhaustive.  
The following analysis sections are organized thematically. The first section focuses on how 
the CSVs are defined and described throughout the discourse. The CSVs are vaguely and 
imprecisely defined, thus enabling the term ‘Core Socialist Values’ to be used flexibly to refer to a 																																																								
75 Cf. Norman Fairclough and Ruth Wodak, “Critical Discourse Analysis”, in Teun A. van Dijk, eds, Discourse 
Studies: A Multidisciplinary Introduction (London: Sage, 1997), pp. 258-284; Teun A. van Dijk, "What is 
Political Discourse Analysis", Belgian Journal of Linguistics 11(1), (1997), pp. 11-52.  
76 Unless otherwise noted, all translations are by the author. 
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moral code bereft of substantive rules. Furthermore, the appeal of the values stems from its 
relationship to traditional culture and its widespread acceptance within society. Revolving around 
the theme of social order and control, the second section discusses the use of the CSVs to regulate 
behavior, and explains how morality is used in combination with the legal system to govern society. 
Finally, in the last section, I discuss the prominence of national interests in the CSVs discourse, and 
suggest that the CCP’s commitment to cultivating moral citizens bears strong historical continuities. 
How the Core Socialist Values are Defined	
 For most of China’s history, morality derived its content from one of two main sources – 
Confucian orthodoxy and Marxism. According to Confucian orthodoxy, Heaven was the source of 
moral virtues.77 Mediating between the heavenly and earthly realm, emperors functioned as moral 
authorities on earth and were tasked with ruling the human world in accordance with heavenly-
ordained moral rules.78 Subsequently, as China came under communist rule, the CCP rejected 
Confucian ideals and values and imbued the content of morality with socialist ideology and 
proletarian consciousness instead.79 Since economic liberalization began in the 1980s, however, the 
retreat of Communist ideology produced a ‘morality-vacuum’ and talk of China’s moral crisis 
emerged.80 I thus begin my analysis by focusing on how the CSVs are defined and the origin of 
these values. 
According to the discourse, the CSVs “represent the nature of socialism, carry forward the 
fine traditional Chinese culture, draw on the best of world civilization and reflect the spirit of the 
times”.81 This standard formulation was first presented in the first policy document on the CSVs, and 
is used consistently throughout the discourse. Reaffirming observations that the CSVs seem like a 
“hotch-potch” 82 of ideas, this all-encompassing description indicates the variety of sources that the 
CSVs are drawn from. In contrast to the clearly defined sources of morality in the past, the CSVs do 
not seem to belong to a single overarching narrative or ideology and thus lack internal coherence.83 
The variety of sources presented does, however, concretize the shift away from socialist ideology, 
which is no longer presented as the sole foundation of morality.  
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While it may be difficult to make sense of the CSVs as a collective whole, the incoherence of 
the values may in fact be a way to accommodate the variety of values and opinions in Chinese 
society. As some Chinese intellectuals recommend, the CCP should present the CSVs as a 
consolidated values framework that allows Marxist ideology, which continues to assume a leading 
role, to coexist with other values.84 Furthermore, the flexibility of political slogans is a source of 
political utility85 – flexible slogans can be politically manipulated or interpreted in numerous ways, 
and appeal to various audiences for different reasons.86  Chen, for example, sees the CSVs’ 
resonance with western democratic values as an indication of China’s current lack of ambition to 
challenge the hegemonic ideologies of Western liberal democratic systems.87  
As a formulaic description, all four components are rhetorically included whenever articles 
refer to the basis of the CSVs. However, they are not equally represented in the discourse – 
traditional culture, in particular, is paid the greatest amount of attention. Traditional culture is 
repeatedly described as a source of “rich nourishment”88 (fengfu yingyang), and an important 
foundation upon which the CSVs are built. The CSVs in turn represent the “inheritance” 89 
(chuancheng) and “upgrading” 90  (shenghua) of traditional culture. Consequently, calls for the 
promotion of CSVs and traditional culture are often made simultaneously, and popularizing 
traditional culture is frequently advocated as one of the ways to foster the CSVs. The other three 
components of the standard formulation in turn feature less prominently. The discourse is peppered 
with largely cursory assertions that socialist ideology continues to play a guiding role. There is, 
however, no further elaboration on the relationship between the CSVs and the “spirit of the times” or 
“world civilization” beyond their inclusion in the standard formulation.  
The prominence of traditional culture in the CSVs discourse further relates to the CCP’s 
broader narrative of historical depth and cultural continuity. The CCP’s positive representations of 
traditional culture and China’s unbroken 5000-year history have drawn significant scholarly attention 
in recent years, and scholars argue that the CCP has reinvented history and traditional culture to 
achieve various political objectives.91 In particular, the CCP references traditional culture and its 
transmission over the course of several thousand years to allude to China’s cultural depth and 																																																								
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strength.92 Similarly, the prominence of traditional culture in the CSVs discourse creates a sense of 
cultural support, and endows the CSVs with a sense of “continuity”93 (lianxu xing) and “stability”94 
(wending xing). Furthermore, of the four components in the standard formulation, traditional culture 
is the only one that is undeniably indigenous. It is thus also used to distinguish the CSVs from 
Western values, and support their suitability for China.95  
Relating more specifically to virtues and morals, China’s glorious past is also praised for its 
high moral standards and exemplary moral education.96 Highlighting the ethical dimensions of 
traditional culture prominently, traditional values such as benevolence and harmony are repeatedly 
referenced, either to point to parallels between traditional values and the CSVs,97 or to support the 
importance of inculcating values and morality.98 It is arguably unsurprising that the CCP chooses to 
use imperial times instead of Maoist China as a frame of reference for present-day China to emulate 
in terms of moral standards. Rather than foreground the socialist narrative and the morally charged 
language that characterized the Cultural Revolution, the Party-state has chosen to point towards the 
more popular and less controversial narrative of traditional culture instead. Given the CCP’s 
rejection of ‘western values’, traditional culture indeed appears to be the most palatable source of 
morality that the CCP can appeal to.  
 It is, however, also worth noting that there are hints of ambivalence towards traditional 
culture in the discourse. Specifically, the CSVs are not to be regarded as a complete copy of 
traditional culture, and traditional culture should not be blindly worshipped.99 Traditional Chinese 
ethics ought to be regarded with a “critical approach”100 and undergo “creative transformation”.101 
This ambivalence can be detected not only in the CSVs discourse but generally across official party 
rhetoric as well.102 It indicates the party’s reluctance to identify entirely with traditional culture, and 
can be explained by the party’s historic antagonism towards traditional culture and continued 
insistence on its socialist identity.  
The notion of ‘consensus’ is also an important rhetoric feature or strategy in the CSVs 
discourse, and is created in part by associating the CSVs with traditional culture. As the discourse 
suggests, traditional culture has strong influences in Chinese society and is an important component 																																																								
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of societal consensus. It has “deep roots in the Chinese people’s mentality, influencing their way of 
thinking and behavior unconsciously”.103 It is thus only with the nourishment of traditional culture, the 
spiritual and cultural foundation of Chinese people,104 that the CSVs are endowed with “vitality”105 
(shengming li) and “influence”106 (yingxiang li). The implication is that the basis of the CSVs’ appeal 
stems from traditional culture. Consequently, the state’s promotion of the CSVs is essentially an 
exercise to promote values that are already widely regarded as normatively correct, and is thus 
more likely to be supported by Chinese citizens. 107 
 Beyond traditional culture, the CSVs are also described as the product of consultations with 
a variety of actors. As Xi Jinping says, in deciding what core values are suitable, “we should 
eventually agree upon this after sorting out opinions and understandings from all walks of life”.108 
The discourse thus presents the CSVs as the “consolidation of consensus within society and the 
party”,109 and as the “greatest common denominator”110 (zui da gong yue shu) of China’s diverse 
Chinese population. These representations in turn support Gow’s interpretation of the CSVs 
campaign as a consensus-building exercise. 111  As a rhetorical strategy, an artificially and 
discursively constructed consensus can induce people to adopt these ‘mainstream’ views. A 
‘consensus’ or ‘mainstream view’ that did not in fact exist may thus be manufactured and turned into 
reality through this discursive process. 112 
 Given that the source of the CSVs lies outside of the party, the CCP’s claim to moral 
authority lies in its ability to distill and articulate these values. This claim is in fact explicitly made – 
“the CSVs existed long before this, but it was the 18th Party Congress that clearly articulated 
them”.113 This implicitly endows the party with authority, as the Chinese state has the final say on 
what constitutes true belief and correct moral behavior, and it is the party’s official pronouncement 
that elevates these twelve specific values above others to the status of core values.  
The ambiguous definitions and flexible usage of the CSVs also add to the CCP’s moral 
authority in subtler ways. With regards to the ambiguity of the CSVs, even though there are twelve 
CSVs in total, they are rarely discussed or referred to on an individual basis. With the exception of 
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two articles that discussed one specific value in great detail, 114 definitions of the individual values 
are conspicuously absent. Despite the consistent emphasis on putting the values into practice, there 
are also little guidelines or instructions that explain how exactly these values can be translated into 
practice. The lack of clarity stands in contrast to moral campaigns of the past. For example, New 
Life Movement directives were specific and comprehensive,115 while virtue rewards during imperial 
times were awarded according to clear and specific criteria during imperial rule.116  
Instead, the CSVs are most frequently referred to and used in their collective form, and this 
relates to the flexible use of the term ‘Core Socialist Values’. In this form, the ‘Core Socialist Values’ 
becomes a tifa or slogan with a stipulative definition, which means that the term is given a specific 
definition. Logically, however, such slogans could take on a variety of stipulative definitions and be 
used to refer to something else altogether. 117 Reflecting this capacity for flexibility, some CSVs 
campaigns described in the articles define the CSVs slightly differently from the original twelve 
identified values, such as by promoting particular values or including new ones altogether.118 
While Xia argues that the capacity for flexibility weakens the power of slogans and increases 
freedom of speech,119 it can also be seen as a determinant of a slogan’s political utility.120 For 
example, the values of friendship, democracy and honesty could be presented as interchangeable 
with or as counterparts to specific traditional values, which in turn helped to make the connection 
between traditional culture and the CSVs more apparent.121  More importantly, throughout the 
discourse, the term ‘Core Socialist Values’ is used primarily as a categorical referent or shorthand 
for a moral-ideological code rather than to refer to the twelve values specifically. Moreover, this is 
not a moral code with specific guidelines or rules. Instead, the rules of the moral code are more 
vaguely defined as anything that is ideologically compatible with the CCP, that contributes to the 
‘Chinese Dream’ and that the CCP approves of. The abstract and vague definitions of the CSVs 
also make it harder for citizens to object to them or question their validity. 
The CCP consequently has the power to police and arbitrate according to poorly defined 
rules. On one hand, vagueness can force people to speculate about what constitutes acceptable or 
unacceptable behavior and can result in greater degrees of self-censorship.122 On the other hand, 
party officials are also tasked with moral policing. Specifically, they are to educate citizens on what 																																																								
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morally acceptable behavior is,123 as well as reward or punish behaviors in accordance with the 
CSVs.124 Considering the vagueness of the CSVs’ moral code, party officials are thus given not only 
the power of moral judgment but also a significant amount of latitude in deciding whether something 
violates or complies with the CSVs. For example, pornography, fake news and violent content are 
explicitly denounced but the discourse does not refer to specific values that are violated, nor does it 
provide more specific reasons beyond their violation of the CSVs.125 As this example suggests, 
rather than refer specifically to the twelve identified values, the term ‘Core Socialist Values’ is used 
instead to invoke the vague sense of a moral code that the CCP controls and dictates. 
Governing Through Moral Norms and Justifications	
Within the CSVs discourse, morality is presented as an important means of achieving social 
control and order, and is thus a key governance tool. In Xi Jinping’s words, the CSVs are an 
“important means of ensuring that the social system operates in a normal manner and that the 
social order is effectively maintained”.126 Thus, the CSVs are frequently discussed in the context of 
“social governance” (shehui zhili).127 They serve as guidelines for social governance, and the 
process of social governance is apparently equivalent to the fostering and inculcation of the 
CSVs.128 Above and beyond the development of moral citizens, the CSVs are also a means of 
achieving the broader goal of social order.129 
The notion that morality is strongly related to social order, as well as the goal of maintaining 
social order, has its roots in traditional Chinese philosophies. According to the doctrine of 
Confucianism, utopia is an ordered and hierarchical but harmonious one. Utopia resulted from the 
goodness and moral conduct of all individuals, and this referred specifically to individuals’ fulfillment 
of moral obligations dictated by the social relationships they were in.130 Thus, individual virtue 
underpins social order and harmony. Moreover, to achieve this, Confucianism advocated the use of 
education and moral suasion to transform people’s inner minds and cultivate their moral selves. In 
particular, the emperor was encouraged to ‘rule by virtue’ (yide zhiguo). Grounded in the Confucian 
belief that virtue has the power to transform oneself as well as others, the emperor’s virtuous 
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conduct would inspire his people towards moral behavior, thus producing moral and social order 
throughout society.131  
Reflecting similar ideas regarding morality and social order, the CSVs discourse adheres to 
the concept of ‘rule by virtue’ and calls for the publicizing of ethical role models132 and “positive 
publicity”133 so as “to inspire the people to esteem virtue, perform good deeds and emulate virtuous 
people”. Party officials, in particular, are called on to rule by virtue, and persuade citizens through 
their “exemplary behavior and noble personalities”.134 Thus, morality is to be promoted in a “gentle 
and lively way”, “like spring drizzle falling without a sound”.135 
The CSVs discourse also consistently articulates the logic of instilling the CSVs amongst 
citizens in order to produce desirable behaviors, which would in turn contribute to social order. The 
CSVs guide people in making value judgments, teach people what to approve and pursue,136 and is 
a moral code that citizens should “internalize”137 (nei hua yu xin). Additionally, the CSVs would also 
help citizens develop “correct” 138 (zhengque) perspectives of China’s history and foreign cultures. 
Given that correctness is defined by the party, this line of argument is reminiscent of the way 
morality was defined in ideological terms during Mao’s era, and points towards the continued 
conflation of ideology and morality. The goal of the CSVs campaign is consequently for the CSVs to 
serve as a “code of conduct”139 (xingwei zhunze) for everyday life, and be so widely and regularly 
practiced that it no longer requires conscious effort.140 Thus, by defining moral norms and instilling 
them within citizens, the Party-state hopes to produce self-governing citizens. In contrast to coercion, 
this would constitute a less resource-intensive and more sustainable mode of governance if it 
proves successful.   
 The issue of governance, especially as it relates to values, perspectives and thoughts, is of 
paramount importance to the CCP given the major changes and developments that China is 
undergoing. Domestically, market reforms and an increasingly open society have resulted in a 
variety of new and different ideas.141 Internationally, countries around the world (including China) 
are engaged in intense ideological competition and exchange.142 The discourse thus paints a 
poignant image of a China that is confronted with competing ideas and value systems, and this is in 																																																								
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turn responsible for various social problems.143 It is also noteworthy that this image resonates with 
Chinese intellectuals’ identification of ‘changing values’ as one of the major threats to the Party-
state’s legitimacy.144  
To cope with such variety, the CSVs are to play a “guiding”145 (yinling) role, “integrat[e] the 
people’s mindset”146 and help produce coherence and conformity. There is also consequently a 
strong emphasis on directing campaign efforts at children and youths, who are at formative ages 
and seen as particularly vulnerable or susceptible to non-orthodox views.147 The CSVs are thus 
meant to help “enhance their ‘thought immunity’, and help them grow healthily in accordance with 
the requirements of the party”.148 Officially defined as the dominant values system, the CSVs thus 
have the potential to be a “stabilizer”149 (wen ding qi) amidst an environment of change. 
Morality is also connected with more coercive forms of governance, and this is perhaps most 
evident from the prominence of the legal theme within the CSVs discourse. Independently of the 
CSVs campaign, China analysts have identified the construction of the socialist rule of law as a 
central pillar of Xi Jinping’s political agenda. Trevaskes even claims that ‘rule by law’ or yifa zhiguo 
has been elevated to the premier governance-related tifa during Xi’s tenure.150 Its prominence within 
the CSVs discourse is thus unsurprising, especially given that one of the twelve values is ‘rule of 
law’ (fazhi). Moreover, one of the two policy documents released by the CCP General Office on the 
CSVs focused solely on the incorporation of the CSVs into the legal system, and the intersection of 
law, morality, and governance. 
Before going into further specifics regarding law and morality in the CSVs discourse, it is 
useful to first note the reference to the age-old opposition between two schools of thought in 
Chinese political tradition – Confucian ‘rule by virtue’ and Legalist ‘rule by law’ (yifa zhiguo). In 
contrast to Confucian methods of moral suasion and education, Legalism advocates the use of 
punishment and coercive methods to regulate people’s external behavior.151 Confucianism and 
Legalism both regarded maintaining social order as the objective, but advocated different modes of 
achieving it. The opposition between these schools of thought is well established in Chinese political 
thought, and features prominently throughout China’s history as well.152  																																																								
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 Good governance, according to the current CCP leadership, requires the combination of 
both modes of governance and the simultaneous promotion of law and morality.153 From the CSVs 
discourse, it is clear that the CCP seeks to establish a values-based governance and legal system. 
The moral code, as embodied by the CSVs, exists prior to and ought to underpin the legal system. 
The CSVs are thus to be incorporated into the legal system, and this is a necessary condition of 
good governance. 154  The legal system should reflect these values 155  as well as support the 
fostering of values amongst citizens. As part of the “basic strategy” 156  (jiben fanglue) for 
implementing the CSVs, the legal system directly influences people’s approval and practice of the 
CSVs and enhances the formation of a value system in society. 
The legal system is embraced in particular because of its ability to compensate for the 
relative “vulnerability”157 (cuiruoxing) of moral or normative norms. Specifically, the appeal of law for 
the CCP lies in its forcefulness and coercive power, and it is this coercive power that would facilitate 
the fostering of the CSVs and morality within society. Most notably, the legal system can help 
transform the CSVs from “soft requirements” (ruanxing yaoqiu) to “hard rules”158 (yingxing guifan). 
The legal system possesses “authority” 159  (quanwei), has “rigid binding powers” 160  (gangxing 
yueshuli), and thus serves as a stricter way of governing and standardizing behaviors. Specifically, 
immoral or undesirable behaviors can be regulated, punished, and eradicated.161 The legal system 
is clearly seen as a powerful way to enhance social control,162 hence Brady’s observation that 
“when the state promotes awareness of the law… it is in order to create more obedient citizenry, it is 
not a means for Chinese citizens to gain more rights”.163  
As the CCP’s combination of ‘rule by law’ and ‘rule by virtue’ suggests, morality and virtues 
are used to imbue its mode of governance with a particular moral character. Updating the traditional 
‘rule by virtue’ doctrine, the CCP seeks to employ the coercive powers of the legal system to 
regulate behavior rather than rely solely on the power of moral suasion and education. This 
adaptation suggests that the CCP is more concerned with maintaining social control, above and 
beyond preserving a social order that is predicated on the moral conduct of citizens, and is 
consistent with views of the CCP’s ‘social management’ (shehui guanli) as a project to help the 																																																								
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Party-state retain its authority in society.164 The absence of clearly defined rules regarding moral 
conduct and the consequent latitude party officials enjoy in sanctioning behavior also point towards 
the goal of maintaining social control rather than producing order.  
This argument further suggests that morality is mobilized for rhetorical rather than 
substantive purposes. Moralistic language is used to justify various methods of control, and the 
Party-state’s construction of a normative agenda helps legitimize supervisory or disciplinary aspects 
of state-society relations. In her analysis of ‘yifa zhiguo’, Trevaskes suggests that the insistence on 
the integration of ‘rule by virtue’ and ‘rule by law’, an important shift in the ‘yifa zhiguo’ discourse, 
implies that the legal system alone is insufficient. Furthermore, its perfection requires the insertion of 
party leadership in all legal-institutional bodies, as their moral virtue will ensure the effective 
implementation of the law.165 Thus, morality is used to justify and reassert the Party’s authority and 
leadership.  
Aside from the legal system, the CSVs have also been used to justify moral policing and 
other more coercive forms of governance. As mentioned earlier, party officials are instructed to 
reward and encourage good behavior, as well as punish and restrict unacceptable behavior.166 
Moral norms are thus supported by brute power, and the reverse arguably holds true as well. For 
example, looking beyond official discourse, the Chinese state has banned a series of things such as 
hip-hop,167 surrogate drinking services,168 and even April Fool’s celebrations,169 in the name of 
upholding the CSVs. With regards to the government’s control of the Internet, audiovisual content 
must be audited to ensure their adherence to the CSVs, 170 and online literature will be subject to a 
scoring system that weights their promotion of the CSVs heavily.171  
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Connecting Private Morality to National Goals 
 Beyond morality’s relevance to governance and social stability, the moral narrative 
presented in the CSVs discourse also strongly relates morality and core values to the nation’s fate. 
To begin with, the way the CSVs are grouped immediately suggests a hierarchy in which national 
values rank first.172 The use of the term ‘citizen’ (gongmin) to describe individual-level values further 
defines individuals as members of a collective political entity. Thus, through the CSVs discourse, the 
Party-state demonstrates its concern first and foremost for the nation rather than for individuals. The 
priority is to inculcate national values amongst youths whereas civic and private morality is of 
secondary importance,173 and patriotism is described as the “deepest, most fundamental and most 
lasting”174 of the CSVs. 
 Framed as a “strategic decision”175 (juece) or “strategy”176 (zhanlue), the CSVs contribute to 
the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation and achievement of the ‘Chinese Dream’ in several ways. 
First of all, the CSVs imbue these goals with “lofty moral ideals”,177 and the hope is that the clear 
articulation and definition of a moral ethos will further instill Chinese citizens with confidence in 
China’s development path.178 The repeated assertion that the “core values… are closely related to 
its history and culture”179 also adds to this, as the aforementioned narrative of cultural continuity 
seeks similarly to inspire confidence by alluding to the cultural strength of the 5000-year-old 
Chinese civilization. 
 Secondly, the CSVs are used to unite the nation in pursuit of a common goal. The aim of the 
CSVs campaign is to inculcate a common set of values amongst Chinese citizens in order to 
develop social coherence and national unity. Emphasizing China’s large and diverse population, the 
CSVs campaign is a “fundamental project for integrating the people’s mindset”.180 As discussed in 
previous sections, the CSVs help to consolidate competing value systems, foster societal 
consensus, and provide thought leadership within society. The result, ideally, is the transformation 
of China’s disparate citizens into a powerful, collective force for the achievement of the nation’s 
goals.181 This calls to mind Sun Yat-sen’s famous characterization of China as ‘a sheet of loose 
sand’ (yi pan san sha), which he evoked to promote nationalism and inspire unity amongst Chinese 
citizens. This metaphor is also explicitly referenced in the CSVs discourse to make a similar point – 																																																								
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“without the CSVs, a nation and its people will lack the cohesion, power and force needed for 
development, and become a sheet of loose sand”.182   
Underlying this argument is the notion that a shared moral ethos and collectively held values 
determine the strength and longevity of the nation. First articulated by Xi Jinping, and then repeated 
throughout the discourse, “the most lasting and profound power for a nation and country is the core 
values acknowledged by all”.183 Core values serve as the “spiritual bonds” 184 (jingshen niudai) that 
society relies on, and provide the spiritual support needed to maintain social harmony, cohesion and 
stability over the long term.185 Furthermore, “without shared core values, a nation and country will be 
at a loss to know what is right and what is wrong, and its people will have no code of conduct to 
follow, the result being that the nation and country can never progress”.186 Consequently, Xi Jinping 
argues that having a moral ethos is what accounts for the Chinese civilization’s continued survival 
and progress over several thousand years.187 Conversely, the social instabilities that other countries 
currently face can be explained by shifts or weaknesses in their core value systems.188 Thus, the 
CSVs are not simply a matter of morality or virtues, but concern the development and future of the 
nation. 
 The Chinese saying ‘a country cannot prosper without virtues, nor can anyone succeed 
without virtues’189 (guo wu de bu xing, ren wu de bu li) succinctly captures the national importance of 
morality, and it is frequently touted throughout the CSVs discourse to emphasize the significance of 
the CSVs.190 As the saying suggests, this idea has strong historical continuities within Chinese 
political thought. According to Confucianism, morality and national prosperity were directly related 
as social and political order was seen as a reflection of, or as coterminous with, moral order.191 The 
morality of the emperor and citizens were thus seen as the foundation of the nation’s peace and 
progress. Such ideas continued to persist, albeit in slightly adapted forms, even after the end of the 
imperial period. Chiang Kai-shek, for example, pointed to the inferiority of Chinese citizens’ morality 
and knowledge as an explanation China’s weakness and humiliation by foreign powers in the early 
20th century.192  																																																								
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 The idea that the perfection of a society is dependent on the perfection of its people, 
especially in moral and spiritual terms, is a strong undercurrent that runs throughout China’s political 
history. Thus, Chinese modes of statecraft and governance from Confucius to Mao have tended to 
prioritize the character of its people and regarded their moral development as its primary task, 193 
over and above building robust institutions. Governments tended to locate the source of problems in 
the character of its citizens, and consequently pursued solutions that focused on rectifying and 
building the moral character of its people. For example, Sun Yat-sen was skeptical about Chinese 
citizens’ readiness for democracy, and recommended initial periods of military and tutelary rule to 
prepare citizens for constitutional rule. 194 More recently, the socialist spiritual civilization campaign 
was implemented in response to the social ills that accompanied economic liberalization, and the 
goal was to endow citizens with ‘correct’ or ‘suitable’ moral attitudes so that they would consume 
and participate in the market economy responsibly.195 
Reflecting historical continuities, morality is similarly seen as a matter of national importance 
in the CSVs discourse, and the Party-state continues to regard the moral development of its people 
as its fundamental task.196 In Xi Jinping’s words, the CSVs “explain what sort of country and society 
we are striving for, and what kind of citizens we are cultivating” (emphasis added). 197 Paternalistic 
attitudes in turn feature strongly in the discourse, as “serving the people” is defined as “educating 
and guiding them”, “upgrading their personal quality” and “enhanc[ing] their moral strength”.198 
There are also calls for the CSVs to be incorporated into all activities and aspects of society199 so 
that they become a ubiquitous feature of everyday life. It is thus clear that the Party-state seeks to 
play an active role in cultivating citizens and civilizing minds. However, the CSVs campaign differs 
from the aforementioned campaigns in that it is launched and implemented during a period of 
relative strength. The moral transformation of citizens is thus not intended as a solution to pressing 
national problems. Rather, it is to produce qualified citizens that complement China’s impressive 
development thus far, and that can contribute to China’s future progress. This is in turn indicative of 
the CCP’s grander aims – “to make one party rule sustainable and to push China towards the goal 																																																								
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context of the suzhi discourse. See for instance, Tamarrs, “Cultivating Citizens: Suzhi (Quality) Discourse in 
the PRC”, Positions: East Asia Cultures Critique 17(3), (2009), pp. 523-535, as well as Haifeng Huang, 
“Personal Character or Social Expectation: A Formal Analysis of ‘Suzhi’ in China”, Journal of Contemporary 
China 25(102), (2016), pp. 908-922.  
194 Huang, “Personal Character or Social Expectation”, p. 909. 
195 Thomas Boutonnet, “From Local Control to Globalized Citizenship: The Civilizing Concept of Wenming in 
Official Chinese Rhetoric”, in Corrado Neri and Florent Villard, eds, Global Fences: Literatures, Limits, Borders 
(Lyon: IETT, 2011), p. 93.  
196 E.g. PD1, RMRB 2014-4, RMRB 2016-1. 
197 Speech 3a. 
198 Speech 5. 
199 E.g. Speech 7, RMRB 2015-3, RMRB 2015-7. 
	 29 
of being a great and strong nation by the achievement of the first centennial goal by 2021”200 – and 
signals a new phase in the country’s development.  
The CSVs campaign not only calls on Chinese citizens to conduct themselves in a virtuous 
manner but, more importantly, to become ideal citizens as constructed and defined by the CCP. The 
interweaving of morality throughout an otherwise nationalistic narrative implies that it is the citizen’s 
moral duty to contribute to the nation. To illustrate this more clearly, in one of Xi Jinping’s speeches, 
he asserts that “what is most important is to cultivate morality”. Elaborating further on what it means 
to cultivate morality, he explains that one needs to have “high ambitions”, which is defined by 
“devot[ing] oneself to one’s country and serv[ing] one’s people” – indeed, “this is the great virtue”. 201 
What it means to serve one’s country varies with each Chinese state – in the contemporary case, 
citizens are called on to have pride and “[shoulder] the mission of national rejuvenation”202 – but o 
matter how it is defined, China’s ideal citizen is above all a moral one. The Chinese notion of 
citizenship thus reflects the influence of traditional Chinese philosophies and historical continuities, 
and features significant moral and normative components.203  
CONCLUDING	REMARKS	
 In summary, this research paper provides a thorough review of the treatment of morality in 
official textual materials relating to the CSVs campaign, and attempts to piece together the moral 
narrative that the Party-state presents through the CSVs. Presented as a moral code, the CSVs are 
vaguely and imprecisely defined, and are not derived from a single ideological orthodoxy. Instead, 
the CCP draws on the ideas of traditional culture and consensus to increase the appeal of the 
CSVs. In the domestic context, the CSVs serve two main purposes. First, the moral norms as laid 
out by the CSVs would help regulate the thoughts and behaviors of citizens, and are thus an 
important means of maintaining social order. Second, the inculcation of the CSVs is regarded as a 
matter of national importance, as it is a means of uniting Chinese citizens in pursuit of a common 
cause. This also further relates to the historic belief that the moral development and perfection of 
citizens is a necessary condition for national prosperity.  
 This research was conducted through an investigation of official discursive materials, and 
thus captures a moral narrative that stems primarily from the perspective of the CCP’s central 
leadership. In so doing, my research is advertently limited by the treatment of the Chinese 
government as a unitary state, and risks creating the impression of a homogenous state that this 
moral narrative uniformly applies to. 																																																								
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 However, located throughout the massive bureaucratic and political apparatus of the 
Chinese state are sites of political contestation that involve a variety of state actors.204  The 
relationships between the central state, local governments and various organizational bodies are an 
important feature of analysis in Chinese statecraft. Furthermore, as Thornton suggests, the 
construction of moral agendas and normative boundaries is one of the key ways in which the central 
state extends and reinforces its political power.205 In the same vein, further research on the various 
activities that claim to promote the CSVs or on local variants of the CSVs campaign, especially in 
areas that are politically contentious or peripheral to state power, could potentially illustrate how 
moral norms that are defined by the central state are reinforced, disputed or negotiated. 
Interestingly, examples of campaign activities within the CSVs discourse suggest that there is 
considerable variation; some campaigns focus on select values, while others include values outside 
of the CSVs. Further research into specific case studies or comparisons between state- and federal-
level campaigns could thus shed light on the means by which the central state controls local 
governments and communities, and the role that moral agendas play in this process.  
 My reliance on official discursive texts also presents additional limitations. The linguistic 
monotony of the discourse facilitated the identification of themes and narrative strands. However, it 
also highlights the fact that these materials were prepared for the specific purpose of  “provid[ing] 
official rationales, positions, guidelines and principles”206, and consumed by a specific type of 
audience that is not representative of the general populace. Thus, while the materials reliably 
convey the moral narrative as intended by the central leadership, this moral narrative does not 
necessarily correspond to the one that is delivered and received by the target of the CSVs 
campaign – China’s general populace.  
 The next logical step would thus be to conduct research on how the CSVs are actually 
delivered to and received by China’s population. As the discourse repeatedly advocates, the CSVs 
would be more effectively promoted throughout society using popular medium and in plain 
language. 207  An analysis of promotion and campaign materials, such as posters, video 
advertisements, and even moral education textbooks, would likely reflect an expanded political 
vocabulary and enrich the moral narrative presented through official texts alone. This would also 
serve as a useful comparison for the narrative presented in the official CSVs discourse, as it would 
be interesting to see how the importance of the CSVs and morality are marketed differently to party 
officials and to China’s increasingly sophisticated population. This could in turn feed into existing 
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literature on the effectiveness and adaptive capacity of the CCP’s contemporary propaganda 
system. 
I began this research by positioning the CSVs campaign within China’s political tradition of 
moral and civic campaigns, and hypothesized that the relationship between morality and politics 
revealed in the CSVs campaign would bear strong historic. For the most part, the moral dimensions 
of governance that culturalists emphasize are not prominent themes in the CSVs discourse. The 
notion that political leaders should be moral exemplars is reflected, as party officials are called on to 
lead by moral example and to guide citizens in making moral decisions. However, the party does not 
explicitly claim to possess moral truth, or any modern-day equivalent of the ‘Mandate of Heaven’. 
The party suggests instead that the CSVs are derived from consensus and traditional culture. 
Moreover, the moral code of the CSVs does not reflect concepts of benevolent governance or the 
government responsibility to respond to the welfare of the citizens. While the campaign itself can be 
interpreted as a demonstration of the state’s concern for the people’s spiritual livelihood, this 
concern stems ultimately from a concern for the collective rather than for the moral welfare of the 
individual. 
My analysis did, however, reveal new ways of understanding the relationship between 
morality and politics, and these in turn relate to different and arguably more salient historical 
continuities. First, my research reflects the state’s use of morality as an instrument or tool for 
governance. According to the Confucian perspective, morality serves as a check on the power of 
the state – a ruler that did not behave virtuously would lose the Mandate of Heaven and the 
legitimate right to rule.208 In contrast, an analysis of the CSVs discourse reveals how morality is 
flexibly defined and used instead to augment the power of the state. Thus, the CCP has the power 
to arbitrate according to poorly defined rules, set moral norms that dictate the boundaries of 
acceptable behavior, and use national goals as the criterion to distinguish between moral and 
immoral things. Responsibility is consequently borne by the people, rather than the state, to prove 
their moral obedience and worthiness.209 Notably, this practice is not a novel one. Dirlik points to the 
New Life Movement as a similar example,210 while Thornton illustrates how various Chinese states 
exercise power through moral agendas.211  
Another historical continuity reflected in the CSVs discourse is the strong relationship 
between morality and collective goals. While propaganda efforts emphasize the cultivation of 
citizens’ private morality, the moral narrative produced by the CSVs discourse highlights a strong 
collective orientation and foregrounds the importance of the CSVs for social order and national 																																																								
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prosperity. Consequently, the validity of the values and the morality of citizens are evaluated in 
terms of their contribution to collective goals, and private morality connects seamlessly to the 
wellbeing of collective entities.  
 These two points can in turn be combined to explain the distinctively Chinese perception of 
the citizen as a “blueprint for ethical refashioning”.212 The political utility of morality stems from a 
long-standing Confucian framework that enables political leaders to elevate the interests of the 
nation over that of the individual. The Confucian tradition of collective morality has arguably endured 
throughout Chinese history, even as the content and nature of morality underwent various 
changes.213 When concepts of citizenship were introduced in the 20th century, late-Qing reformers 
responded by increasing the scope of individuals’ Confucian-based moral obligations to include 
duties to the nation.214 These moral duties to the nation were in turn defined by the Chinese state. 
Thus, in contrast to western conceptions of citizenship, Chinese citizenship includes an important 
normative dimension and the term ‘citizen’ (gongmin) is used to invoke one’s moral obligation to the 
state. The moral narrative presented in the CSVs discourse reflects these continuities, but whether 
this mode of governance will continue to be successful for the regime remains to be seen.  
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1  PD1 关于培育和践行社会主义核心价值观的意
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23/12/2013 CCP General 
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7  Speech 4 从小积极培育和践行社会主义核心价值观 
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行社会主义核心价值观  
01/07/2014 Seeking Truth 
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14  QS2 核心价值观是最持久、最深沉的力量 -
- 学习习近平同志关于社会主义核心价
值观的重要论述  
01/10/2014 
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学习习近平总书记关于在青少年中培育
和践行社会主义核心价值观的重要论述  
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气强基固本的基础工程 
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49  RMRB 2014-29 大力实施核心价值观建设“三五五四”工
程 
02/11/2014 
50  RMRB 2014-30 以核心价值观引领人才培养 12/06/2014 
51  RMRB 2014-31 坚持立德树人 加强社会主义核心价值观教
育——深入学习贯彻习近平同志在北京大
学师生座谈会上的重要讲话精神 ——深入
学习贯彻习近平同志在北京大学师生座谈
会上的重要讲话精神 
23/05/2014 
52  RMRB 2014-32 用核心价值观铸文化软实力之魂 09/11/2014 
53  RMRB 2014-33 核心价值观百场讲坛第十场在北京科大举
行 
27/11/2014 
54  RMRB 2014-34 践行核心价值观应抓好“知、情、意、
行” 
04/11/2014 
55  RMRB 2014-35 增强核心价值观亲和力凝聚力 19/11/2014 
56  RMRB 2014-36 将核心价值观教育有机融入学校工作 19/06/2014 
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57  RMRB 2014-37 新闻工作者践行社会主义核心价值观倡议
书 
31/08/2014 
58  RMRB 2014-38 核心价值观经验交流会发言摘编 16/09/2014 
59  RMRB 2014-39 以“六文明”把核心价值观落到实处 21/09/2014 
60  RMRB 2014-40 让核心价值观之花绽放江淮大地 28/09/2014 
61  RMRB 2014-41 培育和弘扬核心价值观是高校重要使命 19/06/2014 
62  RMRB 2014-42 用核心价值观熔铸企业文化之魂 —— 中
国南车集团公司的探索与实践 
27/06/2014 
63  RMRB 2014-43 全国妇联向全国家庭发出践行社会主义核
心价值观倡议书 
27/09/2014 
64  RMRB 2014-44 发挥新闻媒体宣传核心价值观主渠道作用 30/10/2014 
65  RMRB 2014-45 让社会主义核心价值观的种子在少年儿童
心中生根发芽 
15/05/2014 
66  RMRB 2014-46 全方位推进社会主义核心价值观建设 20/09/2014 
67  RMRB 2014-47 把培育和弘扬核心价值观落细落小落实 19/06/2014 
68  RMRB 2015-1 有效传导社会主义核心价值观 07/05/2015 
69  RMRB 2015-2 好人是一道最美风景——全国践行社会主
义核心价值观弘扬好人文化巡礼 
23/06/2015 
70  RMRB 2015-3 核心价值观，点亮 2014 06/01/2015 
71  RMRB 2015-4 以良好家风弘扬核心价值观 10/08/2015 
72  RMRB 2015-5 以科学辨析把握社会主义自由观 18/05/2015 
73  RMRB 2015-6 推进核心价值观建设目标化系统化品牌化 08/10/2015 
74  RMRB 2015-7 核心价值观，照亮了我们的社会生活 27/02/2015 
75  RMRB 2015-8 核心价值观，确定我们如何存在 07/12/2015 
76  RMRB 2015-9 核心价值观建设需要良法善策 05/03/2015 
77  RMRB 2015-10 核心价值观 就在你身边 28/12/2015 
78  RMRB 2015-11 从“其命维新”看核心价值观自信 27/12/2015 
79  RMRB 2015-12 用核心价值观培养责任公民 ——对湖北荆
门一中打造“正”文化的调研 
02/04/2015 
80  RMRB 2016-1 核心价值观，为中国精神凝魂固本 06/01/2016 
81  RMRB 2016-2 让核心价值观建设进入网络时代 13/05/2016 
82  RMRB 2016-3 用社会主义核心价值观凝心聚力——关于
建设社会主义文化强国 
05/05/2016 
83  RMRB 2016-4 核心价值观为实现中国梦提供思想保证 10/05/2016 
84  RMRB 2016-5 深刻领会核心价值观的统一性 25/03/2016 
85  RMRB 2017-1 共享发展丰富社会主义平等观 22/06/2017 
86  RMRB 2017-2 牢固树立社会主义生态文明观 22/11/2017 
87  RMRB 2017-3 高校社团如何践行核心价值观 02/11/2017 
88  RMRB 2017-4 培育社会主义核心价值观需要两手抓 03/03/2017 
89  RMRB 2017-5 增强社会主义核心价值观的凝聚力引领力 11/08/2017 
90  RMRB 2017-6 黄坤明：培育和践行社会主义核心价值观 17/11/2017 
91  RMRB 2017-7 社会主义核心价值观贯穿民法总则草案 10/03/2017 
92  RMRB 2017-8 知识分子要做践行社会主义核心价值观的
模范 
14/03/2017 
93  RMRB 2017-9 进一步加强社会主义核心价值观网上传播 18/12/2017 
94  RMRB 2017-10 让核心价值观融入社会生活 16/06/2017 
 
